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

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SUBJECT:

Joint Intelligence Community/Department of Defense Effort to Address the Soviet Land-Based Mobile ICBM Challenge 25X1

BACKGROUND:

- The Intelligence Community has been involved with the Soviet mobile missile problem since its genesis.
  - -- In 1977, the Soviets ushered in the era of the mobile offensive ballistic missile by deploying the intermediate range SS-20.
  - -- In 1985, the first road-mobile strategic intercontinental ballistic missile, the SS-25, went operational. 25X1
- The Department of Defense was tasked by the President in July 1985 to recommend "an appropriate program to develop as soon as possible the sensors, C^3I assets, and strategic force structure required to attack relocatable targets." 25X1
- Director Casey established the DCI Mobile Missile Task Force in 1986 to produce a report on options to address the Soviet mobile missile problem.
  - -- This group was established to consolidate an Intelligence Community approach to deal with the mobile missile challenge. 25X1
- In late 1987, the Secretary of Defense and DCI agreed to a joint Department of Defense/Intelligence Community effort to address in particular the difficult targeting aspect of this threat.
  - -- There was clear recognition that planning for intelligence support to targeting, and the associated command, control, and communications programed for the operational forces to hold these relocatable targets at risk, cannot be worked in isolation.
  - -- This has led to the development of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Secretary and me and a detailed Terms of Reference for a joint study analysis over the next two years.
  - -- Our primary objective is to jointly evaluate candidate operational concepts associated with holding this set of targets at risk and propose a coordinated programmatic course of action. 25X1

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- The Intelligence Community also issued an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on Soviet Strategic Offensive Land-Based Mobile Missile Programs in April 1988.

  -- This document provides a comprehensive Community assessment of the unique challenge facing us and will provide a baseline for our work with Department of Defense.

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TALKING POINTS:

- Secretary Carlucci and I expect to sign that MOU this month.

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- Work has already begun on developing a detailed study plan to be completed by mid-November 1988 for the joint targeting support study analysis work.

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- While there is some enhanced funding for this important program contained within the National Foreign Intelligence Program Enhancement Package that is currently being considered by the Appropriations Committees in Congress, I also plan to direct some FY 1990 funding toward this important effort.

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NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (NAPA) PERSONNEL STUDY [redacted] 25X1

BACKGROUND

On 1 September, you conveyed the Second Interim Report of the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) Study of Civilian Personnel Systems to Senator Boren and Congressman Stokes. The Report focuses on staff recruitment, retention, and training, and the impact of changing intelligence requirements on personnel systems. NAPA's central finding is that intelligence agencies with sufficient flexibility in their personnel authorities, particularly in appointment and compensation, have been able to compete with the private sector to meet work force needs. They recommend that these flexibilities be retained and, in specific areas, be augmented. [redacted] 25X1

This Report is far more substantive than the first report submitted last May. Its main shortcoming is that it does not argue convincingly the "uniqueness" issue--that the Intelligence Community requires special personnel policies because its mission is unique and differs substantially from that of other federal agencies. It also does not adequately cover the problem of agencies **within** the Community sequentially increasing levels of personnel benefits, known as the "ratcheting" effect. Both issues were specifically mentioned in the FY 1988 Authorization Conference Report. We hope to remedy this in the Final Report, due to Congress on 20 January 1989. [redacted] 25X1

TALKING POINTS

- o I, along with the senior representatives of the Intelligence Community who have been supporting NAPA in its study, am pleased with the Second Interim Report. We think they have done a comprehensive and substantive review of major work force issues and look forward to an equally thorough treatment of other personnel issues in the Final Report. [redacted] 25X1

- o I support NAPA's finding that judicious use of special authorities has allowed us to compete for talented personnel in the past, and that we will be required to use them in the future. I also endorse the recommendation that the FBI be given flexible recruiting authorities similar to that recently provided to the intelligence components of the military services. [redacted] 25X1

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- NAPA's finding that intelligence agencies need to be able to hire military retirees with unique skills, at a compensation level that will give them an incentive to work in an intelligence agency when needed, is an important one. We will be working with NAPA to identify specific skill areas where this is critical. 25X1

- The Interim Report's treatment of the State Department's Bureau for Intelligence and Research (INR) is somewhat sparse, but we understand that NAPA is currently focusing on INR to be able to present a more comprehensive picture in the Final Report. 25X1

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This Talking Point is being
rewritten at ICS, and the final version
will be provided as soon as possible today.

Date

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